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The Big Questions
• What accounts for variation in provision of social 
insurance and services across countries?
– Why universal health care in some countries vs. others?
– Why more generous unemployment insurance in 
Europe than US and other Anglo-Saxon countries?
– Within Europe, why variations in provision of services 
(child care, family allowances, active labor market 
policies)
• In general, little attention to middle-income 
developing countries
Theoretical Orientation
• Motivated by effects of democracy and 
democratization on social policy and the “third 
wave” of democratization in 1970s-1990s
• Two mechanisms
– Electoral incentives to compete using redistribution 
(Meltzer and Richards)
– Freedom for previously excluded groups to organize
• Design: comparative statics (authoritarian vs. 
democratic regimes) and difference-in-difference 
(transitions to democratic rule)
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• Effects democratization conditioned by 
long-term historical factors and past policies 
(Paul Pierson) 
• Quite obvious variation in what 
authoritarian regimes had done: regime type 
as a blunt instrument
Development, Democracy and 
Welfare States
• Introduction: Towards a Political Economy of Social 
Policy
• Part I. The Historical Origins of Welfare Systems, 1945-
1980
• Ch. 1. Social Policy in Latin America, East Asia and 
Eastern Europe, 1945-1980: An Overview. 
• Ch. 2. The Expansion of Welfare Commitments in Latin 
America, 1945-1980
• Ch. 3. The Expansion of Welfare Commitments in East 
Asia, 1945-1980
• Chapter 4. Building the Socialist Welfare State: the 
Expansion of Welfare Commitments in Eastern Europe, 
1945-1990
Recrafting Social Contracts
• Part II: Democratization, Economic Crisis, and Welfare 
Reform, 1980-2005
• Chapter Five. The Political Economy of Welfare Reform
• Chapter Six. Democracy, Growth and the Expansion of 
Social Contracts in East Asia, 1980-2005
• Chapter Seven. Democracy, Economic Crisis and Social 
Policy in Latin America, 1980-2005




• Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela
• East Asia: Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand
• Eastern Europe:  Bulgaria, Czech, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania 
Part One: Critical Realignments and 
Development Models
• From power resource theories: whether critical 
realignments that affected labor and peasantry might have 
mattered (even in authoritarian settings)
– This pushed in particular toward international context, particularly 
in East Asia and Eastern Europe
• From varieties of capitalism literature: whether 
development strategies might influence policy choices 
– Why? Because authoritarian regimes were clearly doing different 
things
– Import-substitution (Latin America), export-oriented strategies 
(East Asian cases, at different points), and state socialism (Eastern 
Europe) had implications for welfare politics
Latin America:  Transitions from 
Oligarchic Rule (1910s-1950s)
• Reform coalitions based on (partial) incorporation of labor 
unions (1915-1945; Collier and Collier), leading to:
– Highly skewed welfare systems aimed at middle-class and 
segments of urban working class
– Relative neglect of country-side
– Note: these effects operated across regimes of different types
• Re-enforced by ISI strategy
– Protection allows firms to pass higher wage costs--including from 
social insurance--onto consumers…
– …even at well-known cost of dualism in labor markets
• Relative neglect of education
• Intra-regional variations related to regime type (including 
duration): Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay
Central Europe
• Critical realignments in the transition to Communist rule 
(1945-48), repression of competing parties and control of 
labor
– Would an “uninterrupted” path looked more like Latin 
America?
• The crucial role of the state socialist economic system
– Central planning generates employment guarantees and 
social entitlements through socialization of all service 
and insurance provision
– Collectivization extends system into the countryside (in 
contrast to Latin America).
• Intra-regional variation limited: strong convergence
East Asia
• Critical realignments in independence and extension of 
Cold War to Asia (1945-1960)
• Anti-Communist regimes control or repress labor and the 
left
– Minimalist social insurance systems (pensions and health) for 
formal sector workers…
– Basic public health and education extended to rural sector
• Export-led growth strategy re-enforces these choices
– Emphasis on education spurred initially by early democratic 
constitutions…
– But later (under authoritarian regimes), export-led strategies 
generate strong political as well as economic returns to education. 
• Some intra-regional variation related to regime type 
(including duration): “frontline” states vs. Malaysia and 
the Philippines
Part Two: The Shocks of the 
1980s and 1990s
• Democratization: electoral pressures to maintain 
and expand social commitments in all three 
regions.
• BUT new democracies also face cross-cutting 
pressures to reform welfare commitments and 
move toward a liberal model
• The globalization debate
– Does greater openness support or undermine social 
commitments?
– But also powerful economic shocks and ideological 
shifts
The Economic Shocks
• Growth collapses in Latin America and East 
Europe
• Direct economic consequences: fiscal constraints 
on government and the pro-cyclical nature of 
spending and social spending (Wibbels; pooled 
time-series models)
• Political consequences of economic constraints
– Shift in political power toward IFIs and technocratic 
reformers
– Weakening of left, labor and spending ministries 
Figure 7.4: GDP Growth in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay
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The Liberal Welfare Agenda
• Origins in neoliberalism generally and in critique 
of welfare state in particular
• Components (Hacker)
– Shift toward private provision of insurance and services 
(ie., households manage risk)
– Foster competition within public sector (eg. 
decentralization, performance-based budgeting)
– Tighten links between contributions and benefits
– Reallocation of social spending, but with emphasis on 
targeted approaches
Welfare Legacies
• Coverage of public entitlements: the influence of 
beneficiaries
– Broad coverage increases electoral support for the 
welfare status quo
– Narrow coverage provides opportunity to win new 
constituencies through expansion of social programs, 
but also limits ability of stakeholders to defend 
entitlements in the face of shocks.
• Broad coverage also increases leverage of 
bureaucratic interest groups
Core Comparisons
• Crisis vs. non-crisis settings
– Ceteris paribus, easier to expand when economic and ultimately 
fiscal constraints are less
– Asia vs. Latin America and Eastern Europe
• Electoral and interest group implications of welfare legacies, 
particularly the breadth of coverage (Pierson)
– Broad coverage increases electoral support for the welfare status 
quo (Eastern Europe), ceteris paribus
– Narrow coverage provides opportunity to win new constituencies 
through expansion of social programs (Asia and Latin America)…
– …but also limits ability of stakeholders to defend entitlements in 
the face of shocks (Latin America).
Evidence
• Each section framed by cross-national quantitative 
exercises
– In Part 1, simply cross-section correlations: plausibility 
of some hypotheses and of cross-regional differences
– In Part 2, error correction model of spending (a la 
Iverson and Soskice)
• Descriptive statistics
• Case studies with a focus on mechanisms, but 
typically framed comparatively (a la Mill)
The Asian Cases
• East Asia: high growth, limited coverage, should 
generate substantial expansion of public 
commitments in new democracies
• Comparative strategy
– High growth vs. low growth democracies: 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand vs. the Philippines
– The democracies vs. Singapore and Malaysia 
(more limited change)
Latin America
• Latin America: severe crisis and fiscal constraints in context of highly unequal 
coverage 
• Comparative strategy
– Authoritarian cases: Mexico and Peru go farther in neoliberal direction, 
for example Mexico on pensions
– Contrast cases with more substantial crises (Brazil and Argentina) against 
those with less binding economic constraints (Uruguay, Costa Rica, 
Colombia, Chile)
• Comparative strategy II
– Also set up a comparison with Eastern Europe on safety nets
– In Latin America, greater emphasis on targeted anti-poverty programs
– Progressive spending and significant income supplements to poor families 
but (until boom) limited share of fiscal resources and coverage
Eastern Europe
• Eastern Europe: severe crises and fiscal constraints, but  in context of 
broad coverage 
– Encourages de facto maintenance of wide coverage for basic 
entitlements, including pensions and health
– Safety nets tend to be universal: expansion of unemployment 
insurance, pensions, and disability
• Some controversies: intra-regional variation? 
– Regionalists: a major focus
– For us, more convergence, although interesting anomalies such as 
Slovakia (and Baltics out of sample)
Table 5.11: Public and Private Health Spending, 1996 and 2005























Arg 57.6 44.2 42.7 55.8 70.4 48.8 26.0 45.7
Braz 40.4 53.7 59.6 46.3 68.6 64.4 31.4 35.6
Chile 47.4 47.1 52.6 52.9 51.5 46.1 48.4 53.8
Col 64.8 85.8 35.2 14.2 85.4 44.6 14.6 55.4
CR 76.2 77.1 23.8 22.9 87.5 88.7 2.7 2.1
Mexico 41.4 47.1 58.6 52.9 96.6 94.4 3.4 5.6
Peru 51.6 47.3 48.4 52.7 88.2 79.4 9.1 17.3
Urug
Venz 50.8 42.9 49.2 57.1 89.1 88.2 4.6 3.8
LA AV 53.8 55.6 46.3 44.4 79.7 69.3 17.5 27.6
Bulgaria 69.1 57.5 30.9 42.5 100 98 0 0.3
Czech 90.7 89.1 9.3 10.9 100 95.4 0 2.1
Hung 80.8 72.6 19.2 22.4 95.1 93.0 n/a 3.4
Poland 73.5 69.8 26.6 30.2 100 97.9 0 2.1
Romania 66.5 66.0 35.5 34.0 100 93.4 0 0.1
Slovakia 88.7 72.4 11.3 27.6 73.2 73.4 0 0
EE AV 78.2 71.4 22.1 28.8 94.7 9.2 0 1.3
Korea 38.1 50.9 61.9 49.1 85.0 76.0 3.9 8.0
Malaysia 48.0 54.4 52.0 45.6 79.9 74.2 9.0 13.2
Phil 41.0 38.3 59.0 51.7 81.8 77.3 6.6 12.8
Thai 47.2 63.9 52.8 36.1 80.4 76.6 9.5 15.6
Taiwan
Singap 40.8 34.7 59.2 65.3 95.7 96.9 n/a n/a
EA AV 43.0 48.4 57.0 51.6 84.5 80.2 7.3 12.4
LA-EE
p-value)
0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01
LA-EA
p-value
0.05 0.38 0.05 0.50 0.43 0.23 0.12 0.11
EE-EA
p-value
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.00
a. general government spending as a percent of total health spending
b. Private health spending as a percent of total health spending
c. Private households out-of-pocket payments as a percent of private health expenditure
d. Private insurance and risk pooling as a percent of private health expenditure




• Effects of democracy, and institutions more generally, are 
conditional on the distribution of interests and their 
organization
– Part  I: the role of critical realignments and 
development strategies
– Part II: the significance of welfare legacies
• A digression on the left
– In middle-income cases, role less clear
– Evidence that left parties press for more generous 
entitlements…
– …but tensions in our cases between progressive goals 
and defense of stakeholder interests
Conclusions II: 
The Economic Dimension
• “Globalization,” (trade and capital openness) has limited 
direct impact 
– Regional patterns raise questions: expansion in the 
high-growth and highly open Asian democracies 
– Econometric tests: fairly limited effects of both trade 
and financial openness 
• Need for analysis of broader set of economic variables 
– Macroeconomic performance, and its fiscal 
implications  
– Long run fiscal capacity of the state
The Current Crisis
• Who has been most seriously affected?
– Eastern Europe: a battle over entitlements? 
– Latin America: 
• Boom permitted both left and expansion
• Financial (reserves) and fiscal cushions enough?
– East Asia: the most substantial financial 
cushions and most rapid return to growth (the 
China factor)
Some Fundamental Tradeoffs?
• Skepticism about welfare-growth tradeoff, at least 
over the long-run
– The European counterexample
– The differences are in “varieties of capitalism” not 
growth itself
• Universalism vs. targeted approaches
– Universalism can face constraints in absence of 
adequate revenue base (the EE cases)
– But targeting and partial approaches subject to 
segmentation, fiscal reversals and clientelism too
THE END
Expend. Educ. Health Soc. Sec.
DV Change 0.017 -0.149 -0.018 0.175
(0.22) (1.19) (0.19) (1.81)*
Lag DV Level -0.32 -0.153 -0.122 -0.173
(4.67)*** (2.70)*** (3.09)*** (3.49)***
Lag Polity 0.494 0.094 0.018 0.033
(1.27) (0.94) (0.29) (0.25)
Polity Ch. 0.386 0.03 -0.103 -0.018
(0.56) (0.21) (1.11) (0.07)
Revenue 0.359 0.031 0.019 0.069
(4.30)*** (1.82)* (3.05)*** (3.07)***
Rev Change 0.359 0.054 0.039 0.074
(3.54)*** (2.16)** (3.14)*** (2.33)**
Trade Level -0.022 0.001 0.002 -0.012
(1.49) (0.39) (0.86) (1.99)**
Trade Ch. -0.021 -0.011 -0.003 -0.031
(0.83) (1.62) (0.72) (3.10)***
Constant -2.412 -1.764 1.712 0.139
(0.29) (1.14) (1.2) (0.04)
Obs. 238 131 174 170
R-Squared 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.23
Latin America PCSE Difference Models
Further research
• More attention to the determinants of fiscal 
bargains
– What drives the long-run fiscal capacity of the state, for 
example in Latin America and the Philippines)
• Reform-mongering
– Are coalitions a given or are they built, and if so how? 
How do politicians work around interest group 
constraints?
Expend. Educ. Health Soc. Sec.
Lag DV 0.204 -0.103 -0.013 -0.193
(2.41)** (0.82) (0.09) (1.07)
DV Level -0.455 -0.453 -0.131 -0.768
(6.13)*** (4.83)*** (1.35) (3.92)***
Lag Polity 0.893 0.431 0.014 0.224
(2.41)** (3.28)*** (0.19) (1.65)*
Ch Polity -0.135 0.456 0.078 -0.001
(0.18) (3.14)*** (1.08) (0.01)
Revenue 0.516 -0.049 -0.013 0.077
(4.98)*** (2.09)** (1.37) (3.75)***
Rev Change 0.653 0.004 0.013 0.051
(5.05)*** (0.16) (1.17) (2.37)**
Trade Level -0.007 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.78) (1.77)* (1.53) (1.05)
Ch Trade -0.027 0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(1.34) (0.29) (0.54) (1.49)
Constant -5.876 11.584 0.934 -11.394
(0.42) (2.51)** (0.51) (4.44)***
Obs. 88 51 60 46
R-Squared 0.53 0.65 0.35 0.57
East Asia PCSE Difference Models
Expend. Educ. Health Soc. Sec.
DV Change -0.141 0.096 -0.076 0.184
(1.52) (0.63) (0.69) (1.17)
Lag DV Level -0.528 -0.584 -0.241 -0.239
(4.61)*** (5.09)*** (3.06)*** (2.82)***
Lag Polity 0.984 -0.277 0.427 0.663
(1.61) (1.17) (2.22)** (1.47)
Ch Polity -0.214 0.925 0.233 -0.182
(0.22) (1.84)* (0.69) (0.23)
Revenue Level 0.588 -0.016 0.005 0.06
(5.54)*** (0.48) (0.17) (0.83)
Rev Change 0.957 -0.008 0.086 -0.009
(6.99)*** (0.2) (2.29)** (0.09)
Trade Level -0.048 -0.011 0 -0.014
(3.45)*** (1.62) (0.04) (1.11)
Ch. Trade -0.004 0 -0.002 -0.03
(0.16) (0.07) (0.44) (2.40)**
Constant 27.083 9.023 19.757 3.624
(2.07)** (1.53) (2.21)** (0.32)
Obs. 95 50 50 50
R-Squared 0.6 0.64 0.48 0.36
Eastern Europe PCSE Difference Models 
Per Capita GDP Social Security Education Health Total Social Total Government 
1976-1980 Spending/GDP Spending/GDP Spending/GDP Spending/GDP Expenditure/GDP
Latin America
Argentina 5954.6 6.11 .. .. .. 19.46
Brazil 3151.4 6.43 0.80 0.80 8.03 20.08
Chile 3579 8.57 4.30 2.08 14.95 30.13
Colombia 2405.2 .. .. .. .. 11.86
Costa Rica 3189.4 3.15 5.95 4.19 13.29 22.49
Mexico 4587.2 3.41 3.01 0.61 7.03 15.78
Peru 2962 .. 3.18 1.07 .. 18.82
Uruguay 4136 10.30 2.19 1.00 13.49 22.50
Venezuela 7455.2 1.61 4.05 2.07 7.73 24.45
Regional average 4157.8 5.65 3.35 1.69 10.75 20.6
Asia
Korea 2057 0.86 2.66 0.22 3.74 16.28
Malaysia 2514.6 0.82 5.47 1.62 7.91 25.98
Philippines 1527.6 0.24 1.70 0.64 3.40 17.42
Singapore 4549 0.27 2.97 1.45 4.68 19.18
Taiwan 2795.4 .. 3.58 .. .. 22.64
Thailand 1593.6 0.57 3.66 0.77 5.00 17.48
Regional average 2506.2 0.55 3.34 0.81 4.26 19.83
Table 1. Social Spending in East Asia & Latin America 1976-1980
Country
NOTE. Philippine data is for 1979 ~1980. Social security spending includes social security and "labor welfare." Education spending includes educat
and manpower. Total social security spending also includes land distribution, housing, community development  and other social services. 
For Taiwan, education spending includes science and culture. 
Source: World Development Indicators 2002;Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1990, p.171,173 and p.23,published by Council for Economic Planning &
Republic of China;1991 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Chapter 3, table 3.7 and Chapter 15, table 15.3, published by Republic of Philippines, Natio
Coordination Board
Health Spending in Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union, 1980-2000 




















• Framed by quantitative analysis of spending data 
and some outcome measures in both parts
– Cross-section analysis circa 1976-80
– Pooled time series for 1980-2004
• Core is comparative historical analysis in a 
“medium-n” design
– 21 middle-income countries, with focus on (postulated) 
inter-regional variation
– But also exploiting both intra-regional and within 
country variance
– Focus on four policy areas: pensions; health; education 
(Part One); safety nets and anti-poverty programs (Part 
Two), but as components of “welfare complexes”
Safety Nets
• Broad social insurance approaches 
– passive and active labor market policies
– disability
– family and maternity benefits
• Targeted anti-poverty programs
– public works
– in-kind and cash transfers to poor families
– social funds
– conditional assistance or targeted human deveelopment 
programs (Progresa, Bolsa Familia).






















• The logic of the East Asia comparisons
• High growth democracies (Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand)
– Establishment of core social insurance programs 
following transitions, including pension and health 
insurance
– Expansion of unemployment and (in poorer countries) 
anti-poverty programs following crisis
• Vs. authoritarian systems (Singapore and 
Malaysia) and the fiscally-constrained Philippines
– Much more limited expansion and greater propensity to 
opt for liberal reforms, particularly in authoritarian 
cases

